Introduction
Over the past number of months, the proposed new law school at Trinity Western University (TWU) has come under signifi cant attack, including by many whom I count as academic colleagues within the Canadian Association of Law Teachers and by many within the Canadian law school community more generally.
1 Th ese attacks have had the unique eff ect of subjecting TWU's law school to a diff erent approval process than has been used for any other Canadian law school, with a dual-committee structure to apply additional scrutiny to it.
2 Some have put their attacks explicitly in longer forms, 3 and many others have signed petitions against TWU. 4 Let me say at the outset that I do take the critics of TWU to be sincere and to be operating in good faith based on their perceptions of the implications of shared human rights traditions, oft en building upon a deep awareness of experiences of historic discrimination against and oppression of individuals and groups. Th ey also properly see religious beliefs as having public implications. 5 As a result, it is important to face the critics' challenges both respectfully and seriously. Th ere is also no doubting that the positions critical of TWU have much traction within the context of today's highly secularized legal and political culture. 6 However, I will nonetheless be arguing against these critics and, with respect, I consider their position erroneous and dangerous.
It is important to highlight a fact that ultimately has very signifi cant implications: the attacks tend to be framed against the very opening of TWU's law school 7 -based on the extraction and decontextualized presentation of fragments of the school's community covenant.
8 Th e attacks against TWU have appeared in many fora and from various sources, but the two most commonly referenced versions of the attacks have been the brief statement put forward by the Canadian Council of Law Deans seeking a regulatory response to the school 9 and the longer paper published recently by Elaine Craig in the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law.
10 Th e latter of these presents the most sustained and infl uential criticism of TWU and it will thus serve as a foil for some of my arguments here. In treating it as such, I admit that there are some uncertainties of interpretation on points in Craig's article and I attempt to read her arguments as fairly as I can.
In this article, I will challenge the reasoning employed by these critics as being -at least inadvertently -lacking in a spirit of full academic enquiry and in the values of openmindedness to which the critics themselves would generally seek to adhere. I will argue that the methodological approach of TWU's critics risks falling into -putting the point bluntly -stereotyped conceptions of a particular group, that being Evangelical Christians. Furthermore, I contend that this approach amounts to advocacy for limitation on the rights of Evangelical Christian communities that fails to take into account the means normally employed for analyzing rights confl icts. Insofar as these problems exist in their criticisms of TWU, the criticisms should not stand.
Th e Potential Contribution of a Christian Law School
Th e argument for TWU, is not a solely defensive argument. It is important to contextualize the issue by beginning fi rst with an affi rmative case for the unique and important contribution that could be made to Canadian legal education, currently consisting only of an increasing number of secular law schools, 11 by a Christian law school. Although it has gone largely undiscussed in the public discourse around TWU, there is in fact a signifi cant scholarly literature in the United States on the contribution off ered by religious law schools. I wish to highlight three points from that literature as identifying contributions that a school like TWU has the potential to make. 12 First, religiously oriented law schools have the potential to increase the accessibility of legal education to students who may not be well served by existing, secular law schools. An example is illustrative of the point. Th e well-respected Cardozo Law School is based at Yeshiva University, a Jewish university, although Cardozo itself is certainly open to a diverse group of students. Unlike the undergraduate programs at Yeshiva University, Cardozo does not necessarily incorporate more Jewish law in its curriculum than many other American law schools already have. 13 However, by operating in a manner consistent with Orthodox Jewish practice -through full closure of the law school during the Jewish Shabbat/Sabbath and during all Jewish religious holy days, 14 for example, as well as other steps such as the availability of kosher food -Cardozo becomes a far more comfortable place for Orthodox and/ or some other observant Jews than other law schools.
15
Some of the writing on Cardozo has suggested that these ritual-related concerns may not be as signifi cant for Christians, since they may have fewer practical ritual obligations and those that they do have may be more accepted within the general culture. 16 However, I suggest that there may be more to be explored. While it is true that Christian holidays, for example, are better accommodated by the typical academic schedule than those of other religions, the questions raised by Cardozo suggest that a focus on ritual is not necessarily a focus on ritual as such. It is, in fact, a focus on particular matters of greater concern. For many Evangelical Christians, such matters of greater concern are not ritual. 17 To the extent this is so, if those other elements within Evangelical Christian practice, such as religious community, are not well-accommodated at secular law schools, then the accessibility of legal education is a pertinent factor.
My question, in part, is whether there would necessarily be an application from an Evangelical Christian law school if every law school in Canada had always been fully welcoming to Evangelical Christians. How do law school classrooms treat a new student who refers to his or her faith at any point in discussions? How do law professors generally deal with a student who wants to talk about justice in a manner informed by faith traditions rather than a manner that is simply informed using a positivist analysis of cases? Is the social environment of the typical Canadian law school welcoming to those of faith such as Evangelical Christians? When Canadian law schools try to shut down an Evangelical Christian school, they might wish also to explore how their practices might have adverse eff ects on students of faith and on the accessibility of legal education to diff erent communities.
18
Second, the development of religiously based law schools opens the possibility of new forms of legal scholarship. Secular law schools have long patterns of devaluing religious thought and that devaluation puts signifi cant pressures on younger scholars, particularly in their formative years that correspond to the period during which they are under subject to review for tenure and promotion. 19 However, there is little doubting that there are important scholarly contributions to be made to an understanding of law through the bringing to bear of faith-based perspectives.
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Some of the scholarship that may emerge could consist of matters such as retrieval of lost cultural starting points. 21 For example, leading secular writers on the rule of law, writing with the fi nest scholarly publishers, have tended to characterize the concept of the rule of law as having its earliest origins in Greek democratic practice.
22 Yet Christian legal scholarship is able to point to the rule of law model embodied in scriptural texts on Israelite kingship, notably Deuteronomy 17, 23 off ering a simple historical corrective not available without engagement with Judeo-Christian faith traditions.
24 Perhaps more broadly, Christian legal scholarship and legal education would be engaged with many of the very things that secular legal scholars and educators claim to be trying to do, whether to reconstructing the role of narrative or considering diff erent models for dispute resolution.
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Th ird, and building upon this point, Christian legal scholarship brings a distinctive valuesbased engagement with legal thought that is oft en sorely lacking.
26 Th e lack of values-based engagement actually more broadly risks diminishing what secular educational institutions can accomplish in ways that have been the subject of recent concern by the likes of John Sommerville in Th e Decline of the Secular University.
27 Sommerville points to how Christian perspectives may have important contributions to make to the law, noting that " [t] he central problem in law is a doctrinal one, a question of how we should relate to each other. "
28 Interestingly, aside from its place within the law, that is a very central question within faith traditions.
To that question, those bringing faith perspectives may bring important perspectives and values not always found in the case law, at least on its surface. For example, do discussions of the values of compassion, of generosity, or of humility feature prominently in the law school lecture theatre? A religious law school may contribute to the development of graduates focused genuinely on work in the non-profi t sector, an area other law schools claim to be interested in supporting but do surprisingly little to support. Such a school may also be able to communicate about values in ways that resonate with a larger public put off by the perceived values of lawyers and secular law schools. To mention just one example, increasing Evangelical attention to theologies of environmental stewardship may bring to bear values that resonate with a broader public in the development of environmental law. 29 In various ways, the legal scholarship that could be fostered at a Christian law school has very significant potential to make important contributions.
Considering Christian Th inking in an Open-Minded Manner
Having put something of a positive case for what a Christian law school can contribute, I want to face a fi rst instance of the lack of full academic enquiry present in the critics' attacks. Elaine Craig references the priority given to Scripture in TWU's core value statements and then suggests that such a policy means that TWU is therefore incapable of teaching critical thinking skills.
30
Th ere is slightly more argument on the point but there is, for instance, no evidence-based argument for the proposition that eff ectively amounts to a claim that Christians cannot think critically unless they are prepared to abandon their faith through the process of "critical thinking. " As Craig puts the point bluntly, "to teach that all judgment must be guided by the Bible -to teach that the source of truth for all ethical decision making is the scripture -is not to teach the skill of critical thinking about ethical issues. "
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Here is an academic paper about TWU that does not actually explore what such an environment might be like. Craig's argument does not explore the critical thinking of those within broad Christian scholarly traditions at many institutionsscholars who would describe themselves as using faith to illuminate reason but who still engage in extensive critical reasoning.
32 Furthermore, such an argument does not engage in any exploration of how scholarly Evangelicals might engage with Scripture.
I cannot claim to off er any complete analysis on these points in the scope of a short dis-cussion of this sort, but I will make three points that challenge Craig's dismissal of Evangelicals as unengaged in critical thinking. 33 First, there is in fact scholarly literature examining the development of critical thinking skills in those educated in Evangelical Christian environments. Some evidence points toward an equal or possibly even greater acquisition of critical thinking skills than in secular environments. Admittedly, sometimes the focus on critical thinking skills in Christian education is to help in the defence of claims against non-Christian challenges, but there are also strong human developmental reasons within Christian traditions for a commitment to critical thinking. 34 Second, there are many important works on Christian scholarly traditions and diff erent ways in which those traditions may be informed by Scripture as an authoritative guide. Interpreting Scripture is a matter that requires various perspectives -it is not a process of identifying simple propositions. 35 Th ere are internal dialogues within these traditions on the text, with longstanding recognitions, for example, that diff erent parts of law stated in the scriptural law may be distinguished between ceremonial law, civil law, and moral law, with some of these time-bound and others not, and sometimes debate on which is which. 36 Th ere is room for serious ongoing conversations within Christian scholarly traditions, just as has been the case at many universities through the centuries.
Th ird, the work of scholarly Evangelicals is entirely consistent with the possibility of engaging with the Bible in a variety of ways within a faith tradition. Th ere is a very diff erent scholarly Evangelical tradition than many might assume, 37 which will generally not correspond to the stereotype of individuals plucking out random Biblical verses and then applying them all in a literalistic form. For example, a major emphasis in much recent Evangelical writing is on the scriptural text as composed of parts with diff erent genres, making it appropriate to refl ect carefully on what guidance is to be taken from what sorts of books and the genres of writing that they present. 38 Th at sort of claim is not one derived only from recent Evangelical writing but has been at least implicitly present in prominent texts for at least decades. 39 An approach to interpretation that considers the genre of texts is a sophisticated approach that diff ers from the stereotypes and that shows critical thinking even in the interpretive exercise.
Th e fact that somebody commences with faith of some sort should not be a basis for excluding that individual from the realm of critical thinking. To exclude some from the realm of critical thinking works real harm against them and does not seek to understand them. Th e argument frankly refl ects a perspective that, as I say, has not engaged fully in seeking to understand that on which it comments and the living tradition being carried on within Christian scholarly environments.
Th at said, I am not trying to defend freedom for religious educational institutions on the basis that they will not do anything diff erent with it than secular institutions. Defending freedom only for those who will not do anything diff erently would not really be a defence of freedom. Nonetheless, it is an important starting point to notice that there has been very little sustained eff ort by critics to engage with what an Evangelical school might actually be like, and I think this point carries over to other dimensions of the issues.
Th e Community Covenant and Rights Reconciliation
Th e background presented in prior sections is important to understanding the value that a Christian law school has the potential to bring. Th is context also points to some of the ways in which critics have unfairly stereotyped and prejudged Evangelical Christian communities as being incapable of engaging in critical thinking. It off ers a vital framework in which TWU's community should be recognized as having value. Understanding that point, and the rights that belong to that community, is important to answer how to deal with the confl icting rights claims associated with the sexuality-related clause of the community covenant.
It is understandable that critics have expressed concerns about the sexuality-related component of TWU's community covenant, and I have no doubt it refl ects their good faith eff ort to engage with questions of justice and equality. Th ose who are sensitized to rights and equality issues will no doubt have seen within Western societies many instances in which individuals claiming to be acting on Christian values have done very unjust and, indeed, unchristian things in their discriminatory and, sadly, even hateful interactions with, for instance, those with an LGBT identity. However, just as experience with particular individuals from a faith tradition should not drive a prejudgment of a whole faith tradition's necessary approaches, there needs to be careful thought here on the engagement with the living tradition of a faith community in terms of rights reconciliation.
If enacted by a governmental body, the community covenant would of course contain objectionable restraints of various sorts on individual freedom. A government body, however, does not enact the covenant. It is, instead, a holistic set of expectations about behaviours within a privately funded living faith community that has asked to be able to engage in legal scholarship and legal education.
40 Th ere will be many people, for a variety of reasons, who would not comply with its expectations on behaviours and will not be members of that community. By the same token, some will indeed sign on to that community covenant as members of the TWU community, and their religious association right (or collective religious freedom right)
41 cannot be simply ignored. Th ere is a rights confl ict that arises because of rights claimed by those with LGBT identities who wish to attend TWU's law school while asking the living faith community at TWU to change its traditions. Th ey seek changes so that anyone may attend while engaging in sexual activities that are legal under Canadian law but not permitted under the community covenant that refl ects the living faith traditions of the community.
Th e leading approach to rights confl icts within Canadian law is one of attempting to reconcile confl icting rights rather than to prioritize one right over another. Th is sort of emphasis appears present in the Supreme Court of Canada's past decision concerning TWU and the British Columbia College of Teachers. 42 It is explicitly and recently present in the majority approach in N.S., 43 a case concerning a claim by a sexual assault complainant to wear a religious veil while testifying in court. In that latter case, there was a real confl ict between a religious freedom right and a right to full answer and defence. Even in the context of a confl ict with a basic procedural right related to trial fairness, Chief Justice McLachlin's majority judgment explicitly indicates that reconciliation of competing rights claims through mutually modifi catory interpretation of those rights is the preferred option for analysis of confl icting rights, with "balancing" of rights then only a last-resort option.
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In her recent book on freedom of religion, 45 Mary Anne Waldron is somewhat more sceptical of what propositions of this sort have become already embodied in Canadian freedom of religion jurisprudence. Despite this concern, she rightly identifi es a key reason for preferring reconciliation of rights over balancing of rights in the context of such confl icts. Waldron notes that when we understand the whole spectrum of human rights as interconnected, the process of 'balancing' may occur in such a manner as to have a fi rst right eliminate a second right. In such cases, the process actually negates the underlying bases of the second right and thus the basis for all rights' existence. 46 In thinking about reconciling rights in the TWU context, one must consider a living tradition, a community carried on with private funding, up against the claims of others to join its institutions. Th e latter group claim a right to violate agreed moral tenets of those operating within the lived tradition and lived community. 47 Our rights reconciliations in such contexts have in fact typically drawn sharp distinctions between the decisions of state institutions to exclude individuals and the decisions of privately funded associations to exclude individuals in contexts where the exclusions are in tension with equality claims. Th ere are reasons for this diff erentiation, of course, in the proper roles of the state as opposed to the proper limits on the state in its requirement on individuals' private lives to embody the same approach to equality. 48 Stuart White, while advancing the discussion in the context of political theory, has off ered a framework that I would suggest is actually descriptive of the sort of reconciliation applicable within legal contexts. He proposes a framework that considers the competing roles of integrity interests and opportunity interests. In other words, he proposes a framework more nuanced than one which claims that there is never a right to exclude in a manner that aff ects equality interests. A women's gym, for example, can exclude men because there is no genuine loss of opportunity by the men, who have other options. White suggests that any purpose-protecting exclusion rule receives some degree of deference, unless overruled by opportunity interests of individuals negatively aff ected by the exclusion, but with the possibility that these interests can in turn be overruled by individuals' integrity interests. 49 In the circumstances of TWU, it is both the case that (1) those with an LGBT identity who wish to maintain sexual practices in accordance with that identity that do not comply with the TWU community covenant have other opportunities to attend any of a number of other law schools; 50 and that (2) even if one disagrees with the interpretation of the faith tradition embodied within TWU's community covenant, that is the choice of interpretation that TWU, as a community, has made to this point in time. Both factors actually weigh in favour of TWU being able to exclude based on the community covenant provision, even if the exclusions have what would elsewhere be called adverse discrimination eff ects. Recognizing this point is not an easy one for those committed to equality as a central value, but all rights must be subject to reconciliation with other rights if any rights are to mean anything at all. When rights confl icts arise, it is necessary to read each right in a way that fi ts with other rights. Mutual modifi cation between religious freedom rights and equality rights follows, in part, a public-private divide and, in part, an interest analysis looking to the nature of the interests aff ected.
Respect for the religious freedom of a faith community must, in the circumstances of TWU, allow it to carry on with its community covenant. Th at does not mean that there cannot be non-legal challenges put to TWU, asking it to justify its policy. Moral discourse is part of freedom. Th ere may well even be internal challenges within the faith tradition that ask TWU to consider, for instance, whether its objectives might be met by presenting a clear Evangelical Christian viewpoint in its scholarship and teaching without regulating the conduct of students in the particular way that the community covenant does.
51
A challenge that might be put within that discussion is how TWU would see its role in interacting with a potential student who subscribes to TWU's tradition and covenant in every respect but for a sincere disagreement on what Scripture implies on same-sex relationships. What if this potential student struggles to fi t in as an Evangelical Christian at secular law schools but cannot attend TWU due to the confl ict between a longterm committed same-sex relationship and the community covenant?
52 Would this student be less worthy of attendance at TWU than another student who does sign the community covenant under parental pressure but is secretly ignoring the practices to which he or she has subscribed? Th ere are serious questions to ask here, relating generally to the appropriate Christian response to those with LGBT identities who genuinely seek to live as faithful Christians but who genuinely disagree on the interpretation of Scripture on matters related to same-sex relationships. When does a loving, Christian response actually require exclusion for the maintenance of the Christian community's living tradition and when can a loving, Christian response allow inclusion even while potentially challenging the member's views?
I do not purport to have easy answers to a number of the challenging questions raised in the context of the TWU controversy. However, my point remains that discourses within the tradition may produce change over time, precisely because of the kind of view I off ered earlier of the richness of Christian traditions. Any such changes, however, must be based on what TWU concludes is right rather than based on a state-sanctioned rights claim against it.
53 Given our standard reconciliation of rights model, even though some challenging results ensue, the sphere of private religious freedom is one on which the state must not intrude.
On the current interpretation of the community covenant, it is of course clear that TWU has some perspectives, presumably to be discussed in the classroom, that are not in accordance with existing positive Canadian law. However, the public gatekeeper role of the legal profession cannot properly be used to exclude from the legal profession those who have dared to discuss diff erent perspectives on the law or even possible law reform. It may turn out that TWU's perspectives on particular points of the law do not survive. However, if professors' criticism of existing law is grounds for exclusion of a law school's graduates from the legal profession, there is a long line of law faculties at risk. Each law school must be allowed that freedom of thought and discourse, whether secular or religious, unless there is actually affi rmative evidence that its graduates are committed aft erward to actual non-compliance with the law.
54
Craig writes near the end of her article as if the American Bar Association's rules would preclude a law school in similar circumstances as TWU, despite the relatively meaningful religious school exceptions that they contain. 55 What she does not address is that subsequent to the elaboration of the latest ABA text to which she refers, and thus contrary to her suggestions, the ABA went ahead and accredited a new religious school, Faulkner's Th omas Goode Jones's School of Law, that has provisions for student expectations that are very similar to TWU's -and seemingly without the controversy that some writers had expected.
56 Th e American experience of religious schools refl ects a profound respect for religious diversity, a living together in diff erence, from which Canadians can learn much.
A Christian law school has the potential to make a very signifi cant contribution to Canadian legal scholarship and legal education. simply do not exist in the same form in Canada, and, indeed, a case could be made that there remain too few law school spots in Canada rather than too many. 12 Th e word "potential" is signifi cant here. Obviously, the record of TWU will depend upon its actions if it is allowed to operate. Ironically, all of the extra hoops being generated for it to be allowed to operate may unwittingly put pressure on it to prove that it is a law school like all the others, when its greatest potential is precisely in off ering a diff erent approach to legal education and legal scholarship. Only time will tell how the pressures of accreditation and the potential of a Christian law school interact. Compare Lynn R Buzzard, "A Christian Law School: -Images and Vision" 18-20 ("[w] hen he takes the throne of the kingdom, he is to write for himself on a scroll a copy of this law, taken from that of the Levitical priests. It is to be with him, and he is to read it all the days of his life so that he may learn to revere the LORD his God and follow carefully all the words of this law and these decrees and not consider himself better than his fellow Israelites and turn from the law to the right or to the left . " (NIV)). Later successions included kings alluding to this passage through references to seeking not to turn away from law "to the right or to the left ". Th ough later scriptural texts record the failure of Israelite monarchy to achieve these aspirations, what is important is the statement, radical amidst the patterns of Ancient Near Eastern cultures, that the king must be subject to the law and not above it and not above his fellow citizens, presaging many elements of modern descriptions of the rule of law. 24 Cf. generally Sommerville, supra note 21 (discussing at various points the general corrective to historical understandings available through an engagement with Judeo-Christian traditions). 25 A counterargument could be made that some of these aspirations could be achieved via closer engagement of individuals at secular law schools with religious legal scholarship. However, the point at note 19 stands in that there will remain strong disincentives to scholars elsewhere, and a Christian law school has a unique contribution to make in providing a safe space for Christian scholars, even if some will engage elsewhere. 
